First Days of The War
On 24 Feb. 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. Then the war in between occurred mainly at land and in the air, since Ukraine had a too weak navy, it had no chance to act against Russian Black Sea Fleet.
On 3 Jan. 2022, the last NATO warship, a French corvette, had left the Black Sea. They seemed to have intelligence reports, that the situation with Russia in Ukraine would escalate so they did not want to get into direct contact with Russia. NATO abstained to get into direct conflict with Russia that might easily trigger a nuclear war causing catastrophic consequences for both sides.
The Grain Deal
Beginning with the first days of the war, Russia started blockading Ukraine’s ports at the Azov and Black Seas. Since, almost 90% of Ukraine’s trade were flowing through sea ports, Ukraine faced big problems exporting its goods. Ukraine was one of the top exporters of grain and sunflower seeds. This caused a global grain and sunflower oil crisis. Ukraine tried to continue its exports by road and rail transport from Poland and river transport on Danube. However, it was not enough. With the help of its Western allies, Ukraine planned to launch a humanitarian convoy accompanied by naval escorts from UN countries. But, since Russians did not want foreign navies at the Black Sea, Russians inked an aggrement with Turkiye and the UN to allow Ukrainian grain trade. Russia achieved blocking Western warships from entering into Black Sea in the expense of allowing grain flow from Ukraine, but at least they restrict the amount of trade by slowing down the control of grain ships.
Stranded Naval Mines
Bringing Western warships into the Black Sea also came to the fore with naval mine threat. Since late March up to now, more than 30 stranded naval mines were detected mainly in Western Black Sea. Russia accused Ukraine that Ukraine had laid old mines off its coasts to defend itself from Russian landing and that some of those mines were released due to heavy sea conditions. In return, Ukraine claimed that those detected mines were the ones in mine depots which Russia confiscated in its illegal invasion of Crimea in 2014. Another explanation came from Turkiye: Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar allegedly said that some say that mines might be laid to provide means NATO warships enter into the Black Sea.
Closing of The Bosporus to Warships By Turkiye
In contrast with the article 19 of the Montreux Convention, defense and foreign ministers of Turkiye had declared several times that they are urging all countries not to send warships into the Black Sea to prevent further escalation of the war. Normally, Turkiye has the right to block only warring parties (Ukraine and Russia) passing through the Turkish Straits.
Unrealised Amphibious Assault to Odessa
At the beginning of the war, Russia was expected to launch an amphibious assault in Odessa, because they strengthened Black Sea Fleet with amphibious warships from its other fleets. By invading Odessa, Russia could also join forces with Transnistria, a pro-Russia breakaway region of Moldova bordering Ukraine on the Odessa Oblast. The other success for Russia would be to cut the sea connection of Ukraine and destroy its economy. In our opinion, since the Ukrainian armed forces was ready for such an attack, Russia preferred to wait until they siege Odessa also by land for not to lose many soldiers in the amphibious assault. However, Russian forces were not successful conquering Mykolaiv on the east of Odessa and could not reach Odessa by land, so an expected amphibious attack haven’t been realised. Sinking of landing ship Saratov and wounding of two others in Berdyansk in late March might have also contributed deterring Russian landing ops to Odessa.
Ukraine’s Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) Against Russia
Another important factor deterring Russian amphibious assault plan to Odessa was the using of anti-ship missiles and combat unmanned air vehicles (UAV) to attack Russian Black Sea Fleet. Ukraine used its Neptune missiles and Bayraktar combat UAVs to detect and engage surface vessels. It even sinked the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet, the missile cruiser Moskva, on 14 Apr. 2022. Then Denmark provided Ukraine with US-made Harpoon missiles further enhancing Ukraine’s A2AD capability. Recapturing of the Snake Island in June 2022 was also a result of combined use of anti-ship missiles and combat UAVs. The Snake Island perfectly controls the Ukrainian shipping lines of communication which would enable the proposal of humanitarian grain convoys by Western escort warships. This forced Russia to accept the UN and Turkiye’s offer to set the Black Sea Grain Initiative.
Disputing Russian Control of The Black Sea
Parallel to advances in land fronts, Ukraine launched in late October a coordinated assault on Russian warships in Sevastopol. Ukraine used this time a surprise weapon: unmanned surface vessel (USV). Several USVs and UAVs attacked naval port of Sevastopol and the warships at sea. They were controlled by UHF and satellite communication. They managed to hit some warships, though without significant damage. Nevertheless they succeed in forcing Russia to dislocate some of their warships (mainly submarines) from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk and Rostov on Don. Another blow on Black Sea Fleet was the strike of Naval Air Squadron in Crimea by Ukrainian UAVs.
Current Maritime Situation
On the contrary of the situation at the beginning of Russia-Ukraine War, Russia lost its undisputed control in North-Western Black Sea. Since October 2022, Russia was forced to move some of its naval forces out of Sevastopol, the most convenient port for its naval operations. Except some small river vessels, Ukraine have almost no warships. Hence it can not establish sea control, but it managed to dispute sea control of Russia off its remaining sea ports Odessa and Mykolaiv.
What to Expect for The Black Sea
Although Ukraine succeeded in preventing Russian warships based in Sevastopol from operating easily, as notorious Hitler once defined, Crimea is like an unsinkable aircraft carrier. Therefore, Ukraine wants to take Crimea back from Russia to secure its maritime trade. A possible Ukrainian offensive must first obstain a bridgehead on the eastern side of Dnieper River and pass through the 5 km-wide Isthmus Perekop to reach the Crimean peninsula. Then Russia will be left by only Kerch Bridge to support its troops in Crimea. But, as we experienced the explosion on 8 Oct. 2022, Kerch Bridge is vulnerable to attacks. Without the bridge, in the face of a possible Ukrainian offensive in Crimea, Russia would badly need its Black Sea Fleet to support its troops there.
